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Over the past twenty years or so, intelligence and security services in several 
Western countries and in Russia as well have allowed official histories to be 
published.1 Authors, in some cases in-house historians, were given access to 
archives of the service and allowed their use for the publication, albeit in all 
cases with limitations as we shall see. This article discusses official histories 
which have been published in several Western countries and in Russia since 
the 1990s.2  In a slightly wider context, the article also briefly discusses 
other ways in which intelligence and security services sometimes practice 
openness towards the academic community and the public, mainly by the 
declassification of material from their archives. The term ‘official history’ in 
this article refers to a history of a service which is written with full access to 
the archives by an author who is a member of the service or by an 
independent outside historian who is not. Contrary to usual academic 
practice, in the case of official histories access to the archives of the service 
is limited to one author or group of authors, in most cases chosen by the 
                                                     
1  The author is grateful to Dr. Eleni Braat, Leiden University, Dan Mulvenna, 
Florida (USA), and Gloria Reyes, University of Cologne, Germany for their critical 
remarks on an earlier version of this article. Furthermore, for more background 
information on this topic, Leidschrift recommends that one should take a look at the 
book review on page 149 of this issue.  
2 The official history of the Australian Security intelligence Service (ASIO) was 
recently published: D. Horner, The Spy Catchers: The Official history of ASIO 1949-1963. 
Volume I (Sydney 2014). This book is reviewed elsewhere in this issue. In 1998 a 
two-volume official history of the Norwegian security service Politiets 
Sikkerhetstjeneste (PST) was published in Norway and a similar volume was 
published in Denmark on the history of the security service Politiets 
Efterretningstjeneste (PET). In Germany, official histories of both the foreign 
intelligence service Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) and the security service 
Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) are in preparation. Separate monographs 
have already been published on the history of the BND on the basis of full archive 
access. The German, Norwegian and Danish official histories will not be discussed 
here. See the review by Cees Wiebes of Horner where these other official histories 
are mentioned, http://www.nisa-intelligence.nl/PDF-
bestanden/ReviewHorner_CWiebes_2015.pdf, accessed 10 April 2015. For the 
BND history project see http://www.uhk-bnd.de/, accessed 15 April 2015.  




service, and not given to other historians. This highly problematic aspect of 
official histories will be discussed here as well.3 
 
Limitations of official histories  
 
In the preface to the recently published official history of the Australian 
Security Intelligence Service (ASIO), entitled The Spy Catchers, the author 
David Horner explains the limitations that apply to his book with respect to 
the use of archives. These limitations apply in some form to practically all 
other official histories as well. Intelligence and security services have a 
strong mission to protect the real identity of their agents and their so-called 
modus operandi. They will generally never give full access to their archives 
to outsiders for that reason. Only those ASIO agents are therefore 
mentioned in The Spy Catchers whose identities were already in the public 
domain, in most cases through a decision of their own.4 Officers of the 
service, to the extent that they are not already known to the public through 
earlier publications, are only mentioned in the book with their consent. 
David Horner, a historian at the Australian National University, had 
unlimited access to the non-redacted files of the Organisation, as ASIO is 
often called. Thus, this is a history of ASIO written by an independent 
outside historian, i.e. one who was not a member of the service, and it is 
based to a large extent, but not only, on ASIO’s own records. Other 
academics who might be interested in the subject, however, do not have 
                                                     
3 Within intelligence and security services, official histories of the service or of 
separate branches are often written for internal use. Even within a service, these 
histories are often only accessible to a limited number of people and they are only 
declassified sporadically, if at all. An internal history of the British Security Service 
MI5, for instance, which covered the years 1909-1945, was declassified at the end 
of the twentieth century. ‘Transcript of the Lecture by the Director General of the 
Security Service, Sir Stephen Lander, to the Public Records Office Conference 
“The Missing Dimension”, 21 June 2001’. https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-
us/who-we-are/staff-and-management/director-general/speeches-by-the-director-
general/director-generals-speech-to-the-pro-2001.html, accessed 7 June 2015. See 
also: N. West and O. Tsarev ed., Triplex: Secrets from the Cambridge Spies (New Haven, 
CT and London 2009) 26. 
4 Michael Bialoguski, for instance, the ASIO agent who played a crucial role in the 
Petrov defection, published his own memoirs very soon after it all happened. M. 
Bialoguski, The Petrov Story (Melbourne 1955).  




access to the records used by the author. Indeed, the many notes in The Spy 
Catchers which refer to the archive of the service simply say ‘ASIO files’ 
without a file number, because the ASIO filing system still remains 
classified. Strictly speaking, this is, of course, a highly undesirable situation 
from an academic point of view but one has simply to put up with this, or 
so it seems, if official histories are to be written. With some modifications 
which will be discussed, the other official histories that are mentioned in 
this article have been written in a similar way, i.e. the files of the particular 
service were made accessible to one historian or group of historians but 
remain closed to all others.  
 
 
Official histories of the Dutch security service 
 
Possibly the first official history which was written in a Western country on 
this condition is the one on the Dutch service Binnenlandse 
Veiligheidsdienst (Domestic Security Service, Dutch acronym BVD) by 
Dick Engelen, a former officer of the service.5 It was published in 1995, 
quite some years before the British services MI5 and MI6 published their 
official histories, in 2009 and 2010 respectively. A follow-up volume was 
published by the same author in 2007.6 Engelen’s two books were the first 
in the Netherlands based on the BVD archives, to which as a historian 
writing at the behest of the then Minister of Internal Affairs he had 
unlimited access. His books revealed many details of the history of the 
service, which so far had not been known to historians and the wider public. 
These related, for instance, to the far-reaching penetration of the Dutch 
Communist Party (Dutch acronym CPN) by the BVD and the close 
cooperation of the Dutch service with the Americans, the CIA in particular. 
To give just one example of this cooperation: at the beginning of the 1960s 
the BVD had installed microphones made available by the CIA in the newly 
                                                     
5 The BVD existed by that name from 1949 to 2002. From 2002 its successor 
organization is the Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst [General Intelligence 
and Security Service, Dutch acronym AIVD]. 
6  D. Engelen, Geschiedenis van de Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst [History of the 
Domestic Security Service] (’s-Gravenhage 1995). Engelen also wrote a follow-up 
volume: D. Engelen, Frontdienst. De BVD in de Koude Oorlog [Front Service. The 
BVD in the Cold War] (Amsterdam 2007). Both volumes basically cover the Cold 
War period.  




established communist Chinese representation in The Hague. The BVD 
carried out the eavesdropping operation but shared its intelligence product 
with the CIA. Another revelation from the book is that the CIA in the early 
Cold War period paid part of the budget of the BVD, a practice which only 
came to an end at the beginning of the 1960s. Engelen’s first book was his 
Ph.D. dissertation, which was supervised by a commission of expert 
academics from the Netherlands who, within the framework of the project, 
were also given unlimited access to the BVD archives. The same access was 
given to the members of the commission which supervised his second book. 
In contrast to the The Spy Catchers volume, both of Engelen’s works give the 
exact numbers of the files he refers to in the notes, with the explicit aim to 
make it possible for other researchers to apply for a copy of a file through 
the Dutch version of the Freedom of Information Act.7  
The two volumes by Engelen are very important contributions to the 
historiography of Dutch intelligence. One important objection, however, is 
that in a ‘normal’ academic discipline, several books could be written on the 
basis of the same archive material, posing different questions and treating 
separate aspects of the history of the service. This is obviously not possible 
the way official histories are written, since only one author or a group of 
authors has access to the material. A recent work by a Dutch intelligence 
historian, who wrote a book which was originally not meant for publication, 
offers a good example of what can happen if another historian makes use of 
the same archives. Eleni Braat, who was until recently employed by the 
BVD’s successor, the Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, as an in-
house historian, wrote a social history of the BVD, for which she 
interviewed former members of the service and used material from the 
archives as well.8 Once the book was finished the AIVD decided it should 
be an internal publication, but a scanned copy of it found its way to a 
website in the Netherlands fairly soon, where it is now accessible for those 
                                                     
7 In the case of Engelen’s second book, it has also been possible for readers to 
receive a cd-rom with digital copies of all the files the author makes a reference to 
in the notes. The files are made available by the successor organization of the BVD, 
the AIVD, in heavily redacted form, however.  
8  E. Braat, Van oude jongens, de dingen die voorbijgaan… Een sociale geschiedenis van de 
Binnenlandse Veiligheidsdienst 1945-1998 [Old boys and the days that were … A social 
history of the Domestic Security Service 1945-1998] (n.p. 2012).  




interested.9 It is interesting to see how Eleni Braat, partly on the basis of the 
same material to which Dick Engelen had access, wrote a completely 
different book which tried to answer its own set of questions. She poses 
questions such as: ‘How did the members of the service deal with the 
pressure of excessive secrecy they were asked to practice, not only towards 
the outside world but also in many cases towards close family members and 
their own colleagues?’ And: ‘What was the part played by the early post-
WW II generation of officers in the service, many of whom had taken part 
in resistance activities against the German occupation during the war? What 
was the role of women in the service like?’ Asking different sets of 
questions to the same material is, of course, what normally happens if you 
give different historians access to the same material. By limiting access to 
the archives in the way it is usually done when official intelligence histories 
are written, the work of other historians – except the ‘chosen ones’ – is in 
practice made impossible; the history of a particular service is only limited 
to one version, which is strictly speaking highly undesirable. Free access to 
sources for a variety of historians, as is normal practice, generates different 
interpretations and tends to stimulate discussion and debate whereas 
limiting access tends to do the opposite.  
 
 
Official histories in Britain 
 
In 2009 the ‘authorised history’ of MI5, as the British Security Service is 
often called, was published as Defence of the Realm, written by the well-known 
intelligence historian Christopher Andrew. 10  It came out almost 
simultaneously with the official history of the Secret Intelligence Service 
(SIS, commonly known as MI6) on the occasion of the centenary of the two 
services which were both founded in 1909. One of the many positive 
aspects of the book on MI5 is the fact that it covers the whole period of the 
existence of the service from its founding in 1909 up to the present time. 
Understandably, the material that was left out of the book for national 
security reasons tends to grow in volume the closer one gets to the present 
day, as the Director General of MI5, Jonathan Evans, remarks in his 
foreword. Evans makes clear the reasoning of the service behind the 
                                                     
9 To be found at http://www.inlichtingendiensten.nl/literatuur/oudejongens.pdf, 
accessed 19 March 2015.  
10 C. Andrew, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (London 2010). 




decision to commission a book like this from an independent scholar. He 
emphasizes the importance of being ‘as open and transparent as possible, 
within the constraints of what the law allows, because that openness, by 
supporting public confidence in us, helps us do our job of protecting 
national security.’ In a similar vein, the service wanted an independent 
scholar like Andrew to reach his own conclusions in the book.11 Indeed, 
there is no lack of independent judgments. One chapter discusses the hunt 
for the Cambridge Five, arguably the best-known and most successful 
Soviet spy ring in the West in the 1930s and 1940s, by the Security Service 
and hints at critical mistakes that were made in that regard by MI5. 12 
Another chapter with the subtitle ‘Paranoid Tendencies’ has some very 
harsh words about the attempts from within the service in the 1960s to 
prove that its Director General Roger Hollis and in an earlier stage of the 
investigation, his deputy, were Soviet agents.13 In his discussion of the post-
Cold War period, Andrew gives some interesting numbers, based on 
material from Security Service archives, about the relative efforts devoted to 
counterespionage, countersubversion and counterterrorism in later years. In 
early 1974, 52 per cent of the resources of MI5 were spent on 
counterespionage and 28 per cent on countersubversion. The attention 
given to counterterrorism, in spite of the Irish Republican Army problem, 
was in other words relatively small. After 9/11 in the US, the relative share 
                                                     
11 Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, xvi-xvii. This is what ‘authorised’ apparently 
means, as the Director General of MI5 says in the foreword: it was written by an 
independent historian who came to his own judgements and conclusions, not by a 
member of the service. In that sense David Horner’s The Spy Catchers is also 
‘authorised’, of course, even though it is labelled an ‘official history’. This article 
does not make a distinction between an ‘official’ and an ‘authorised’ history in this 
way. 
12 Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, 420-441. The Cambridge Five, among them Kim 
Philby (1912-1988), Guy Burgess (1911-1963) and John Cairncross (1913-1995) 
were students at Cambridge in the 1930s or had recently graduated when they were 
recruited by the KGB’s predecessor, the NKVD. They were all to hold important 
positions within British government departments in the 1940s from which they 
betrayed many secrets to the Russians.  
13 One of the main protagonists in this hotly debated issue within MI5 was Peter 
Wright. For his views see P. Wright, Spycatcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior 
Intelligence Officer (New York, NY 1987). The Hollis case is a controversial issue even 
to this day. See, for instance, C. Pincher, Treachery. Betrayals, Blunders and Cover-ups: 
Six Decades of Espionage Against America and Great Britain (New York, NY 2009).  




of counterespionage went down sharply in the work of MI5 as opposed to 
counterterrorism Drawing upon one of the Annual Reports of the 
Intelligence and Security Committee of the British Parliament, the author 
writes that ‘by 2008-2009 three-quarters of the Security Service’s resources 
were devoted to countering Islamist terrorism.’14 In contrast, the Dutch 
service AIVD does not release information about the relative share of 
counterespionage and counterterrorism in its operations.15  
If one reads the official history of MI6 written by Keith Jeffery, 
which came out a year after Andrew’s history of MI5, it comes as a 
disappointment, mainly because of the relatively short period that is covered, 
1909-1949. In this case there is also an independent historian who received 
unrestricted access to the archives, but the arguments the Chief of the 
Secret Intelligence Service offers in the preface for the limited period 
covered in the book cannot be called persuasive. Most important among 
those is his view that ‘full details of our history after 1949 are still too 
sensitive to be placed in the public domain.’16 Apart from this rather vague 
argument, the reasons for the limited time period chosen are not entirely 
clear. There is at any rate no intention to bring out another volume later to 
cover the period after 1949. One cannot escape the impression that an 
important reason for choosing 1949 as the endpoint has to do with the fact 
that probably the two most disastrous cases of treason in the history of MI6, 
the ones regarding Kim Philby and George Blake, are largely left out by the 
choice of this time frame.17 There is some discussion of Philby, necessarily 
so since he entered MI6 in 1940, but in this way the period in which he 
possibly did the most damage (1949-51), remains conveniently untouched. 
This was the period during which he was the MI6 liaison in Washington 
D.C. and was therefore in a position to betray many US intelligence secrets 
to the Russians as well. In the caption to one of the pictures in the book, 
Philby is called ‘SIS’s worst traitor’ with good reason. Blake entered the 
service in 1944 and is mentioned in passing at the end of the book in just 
                                                     
14 Andrew, The Defence of the Realm, 616, 835. 
15  Neither do Dick Engelen’s two books mentioned earlier, since they do not 
discuss the post-Cold War period. 
16 K. Jeffery, MI6: The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1949 (London 2010) 
vii. 
17 Philby made it to Moscow from Lebanon in 1963 and Blake (1922-) confessed to 
spying for the KGB in 1961 and was sentenced by a British court to 42 years in 
prison. He subsequently escaped to the USSR in 1966. 




one paragraph. Apparently there was much about Blake’s background which 
MI6 failed to discover before he entered the service, the influence exerted 
upon him by an older cousin by the name of Henri Curiel, a co-founder of 
the Egyptian Communist Party, among other things. We know this from 
Christopher Andrew’s Defence of the Realm, however, not from the official 
MI6 history. 18  Alone for the reason of the restricted period covered, 
therefore, the MI6 volume is a bit of a disappointment.19  
 
 
Official history the Russian way 
 
In Russia a six-volume series of Essays on the History of Russian Foreign 
Intelligence was published from 1999 to 2006 in Moscow which is of 
particular interest here.20 The series was written by a group of authors who 
were all employed by the present Russian intelligence service, the Sluzhba 
Vneshney Razvedki (Foreign Intelligence Service, SVR).21 It is clear from 
the way the series is set up that the authors place the SVR squarely in the 
tradition and footsteps of the KGB and its predecessor organisations from 
the Soviet period. The sixth volume, for instance, covers the period 1966-
2005, which is, to phrase it in Stalinist terms, ‘no coincidence’.22 The series 
                                                     
18 Andrew, Defence of the Realm, 488. 
19 The Dutch official histories discussed here cover a much larger period as will the 
official history of ASIO, which will consist of three volumes, with 1989 as the final 
year covered. Horner, The Spy Catchers, xvii. 
20  Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoy Vneshney Razvedki [Essays on the History of Russian 
Foreign Intelligence] (Moscow 1999-2006), six volumes. The volumes were written 
and edited by a group of authors which varied in composition over the years. 
Prominent among them were E.M. Primakov (1929-2015), director of the SVR in 
1991-1996, and V.A. Kirpichenko (1921-2005) a long-time officer of the KGB and 
the SVR who rose to the rank of lieutenant general.  
21 The SVR is the successor organisation of the intelligence branch of the KGB, 
The First Chief Directorate (FCD). It was established in 1991.  
22  The process of putting the SVR and other Russian intelligence and security 
services in the footsteps of the KGB already started under president Yeltsin when 
in 1995, for instance, he proclaimed December 20 as the ‘Day of the worker of the 
organs of state security of the Russian Federation’. See Sobraniye Zakonodatelstva 
Rossiyskoy Federatsii [Collection of Laws of the Russian Federation], no. 52, 25 
December 1995, no. 5135. This process was then carried further under President 
Putin. December 20, 1917 was the date the first Soviet security service was founded 




mostly consists of short historical profiles of important officers or agents 
from the history of the Soviet intelligence service and it definitely adds 
important new information. There is, for instance, an interesting chapter on 
a former high-ranking Nazi SA officer by the name of Walter Stennes about 
whose involvement with Soviet intelligence very little was known until 
recently. After a falling out with Hitler and Goebbels in 1930-1931 Stennes 
left Germany in 1933 to become a military adviser to the Chinese nationalist 
leader Chang Kai-shek in China, where he stayed until 1949 and where he 
was recruited by the Narodny Komissariat Vnutrennykh Del (People’s 
Commissariat of Internal Affairs, Russian acronym NKVD), one of the 
predecessors of the KGB in the Stalin era.23 Among other things, he gave 
information to the Soviet leadership about the threat of a Nazi attack 
against the USSR which materialised in June 1941. As in practically all other 
cases which involved warnings against the German attack, this one was also 
ignored by Stalin.  
Sometimes the Essays on the History of Russian Foreign Intelligence 
offer important little details which add to the story of agents that are already 
known. John Cairncross, one of the Cambridge Five, writes in his 
autobiography, for instance, that he was never a member of the Communist 
Party, whereas this is contradicted in the Essays on the History of Russian 
Foreign Intelligence. 24  In this instance the Russian authors’ collective is 
                                                                                                                       
under Lenin, followed on December 20, 1920 by the foreign intelligence 
department of that service. December 20 was for that reason a day of celebration in 
the former KGB, as it is again these days for the Russian services. 
23 E.M. Primakov a.o. ed., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoy Vneshney Razvedki, tom 3, 1933-
1941 gody [volume 3, the years 1933-1941] (Moscow 1997) 386-394. The case of 
Walter Stennes (1895-1989) is briefly mentioned in Christopher Andrew and Vasili 
Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West. (London 2000) 124. 
Mitrokhin was a KGB archivist with the First Chief Directorate who escaped to the 
West in the beginning of the 1990s with a huge volume of material from the KGB 
archives which he had copied illegally at great personal risk. The two volumes 
written on the basis of his material by Andrew and Mitrokhin offer the most 
extensive overview of KGB intelligence operations all over the world. These are 
Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive  and Idem, The Mitrokhin Arkhive II: 
The KGB and the World (London 2006).  
24 J. Cairncross, The Enigma Spy: The Story of the Man Who Changed the Course of World 
War Two (London 1997) 42; V.I. Trubnikov a.o. ed., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoy 
Vneshney Razvedki, Tom 4, 1941-1945 gody [volume 4, the years 1941-1945] (Moscow 
1999) 180.  




probably right. In other instances, it seems they simply leave out 
information which in their view does not reflect well on the KGB or its 
predecessors and its personnel. One example may suffice here. Christopher 
Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin in their seminal work on KGB foreign 
operations discuss the activities of the NKVD in Spain during the Civil War 
in the second half of the 1930s, when the USSR supported the Republican 
side in the conflict. They mention an NKVD officer by the name of S.A. 
Vaupshasov, a leading expert in assassinations, who played an important 
part in constructing and guarding a crematorium in Spain at the time, where 
the bodies of victims of the NKVD were disposed of without leaving a 
trace. According to Andrew and Mitrokhin, many of the victims were first 
lured to the building and then killed on the spot. Earlier in his career, in 
1929 in the Soviet Union, Vaupshasov had been sentenced to death for 
murdering a colleague. The sentence had, however, been commuted to ten 
years imprisonment and he had been released prematurely. Remarkably, 
these rather striking episodes from Vaupshasov’s career are nowhere to be 
found in the profile written about him by the SVR authors’ collective.25  
On a slightly different note, it is worth looking at the personality of 
Guy Burgess, another of the Cambridge Five, as presented in the SVR series. 
It is widely known about Burgess from Western publications that he was a 
flamboyant personality with a rather unusual lifestyle, a consumer of large 
quantities of alcohol, like most of the Cambridge Five, and a very active 
homosexual. Burgess also had a very shrewd intellect. It would be difficult if 
not impossible to imagine a book or an article published about him in the 
West these days in which these character traits including his sexual 
inclinations would not be mentioned. Indeed, during a trip to Gibraltar and 
Tangier in 1949, the way Andrew describes it in the official history of MI5, 
Burgess failed to pay some of his bills, he publicly identified MI5 and MI6 
officers and was heard drunkenly singing in local bars, ‘Little boys are cheap 
today, cheaper than yesterday.’ 26  The Essays on the History of Russian 
Foreign Intelligence in one of its volumes has a profile of Burgess in which 
he is characterised as: 
 
an unusual and contradictory personality. In combination with his 
extraordinary natural talents, his sharp analytical mind and his broad and 
                                                     
25 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, 97; V.I. Trubnikov a.o. ed., Ocherki 
Istorii Rossiyskoy Vneshney Razvedki, Tom 4, 1941-1945 gody, 88-95.  
26 Andrew, Defence of the Realm, 422. Burgess fled to Moscow in 1951.  




many-sided education, every now and then he surprised his acquaintances 
by his extravagant behaviour. Burgess distanced himself from the 
‘bourgeois world view’ and made this known openly and in the unbalanced 
manner which was typical for his character. He showed it by his 
‘scandalous’ behaviour and his bohemian life style. He intentionally 
dressed in a shabby manner, he drank a lot and was aggressive in disputes 
with his opponents.27  
 
Amazingly, there is no explicit mention here or elsewhere in the Essays on 
the History of Russian Foreign Intelligence of Burgess’ homosexuality. This 
is in spite of the fact, mentioned in the profile, that Burgess’ NKVD code 
name in the 1930s was Mädchen, ‘girl’ in German, which is a clear allusion to 
his sexual orientation on the part of the Austrian NKVD officer who 
recruited him in 1934, the legendary Arnold Deutsch. 28  Burgess’ 
homosexuality is not mentioned in the short profile of him on the SVR 
website either.29 He is labelled there as a ‘Soviet razvedchik’, i.e. a Soviet 
intelligence officer or a staff member of the Soviet service, and not as an 
‘agent’, as he should be.30 This was probably done because of the negative 
                                                     
27 E.M. Primakov a.o. ed., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoy Vneshney Razvedki, Tom 3, 1933-
1941 gody, 50. Yuri Modin, who was in the late 1940s the case officer of several of 
the Cambridge Five in London, mentions Burgess’ homosexuality in his memoirs. 
These would otherwise be barely credible, of course, for Western readers. See Y. 
Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends (London 1994). See also A.I. Kolpakidi and D.P. 
Prokhorov, Vneshnaya razvedka Rossii [Russia’s foreign intelligence service] (St. 
Petersburg and Moscow 2001) 419-420, for another case in which the 
homosexuality of an agent recruited by the KGB is not mentioned. This is the case 
of John Vassall, who was recruited by the KGB in Moscow in 1955 by a 
homosexual ‘honey trap’, i.e. he was seduced by a male KGB agent and 
subsequently blackmailed. See Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, 523 
for the real story of the Vassall recruitment.  
28  For the recruitment of Burgess by Deutsch (1904-1942) see Andrew and 
Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, 79-80. 
29 See http://svr.gov.ru/history/ber.htm, accessed 19 March 2015. 
30  The defector Vasili Mitrokhin in his KGB Lexicon defines a razvedchik as a ‘staff 
member of an intelligence agency, engaged in organizing and conducting 
intelligence activities.’ V. Mitrokhin ed., KGB Lexicon: The Soviet Intelligence Officer’s 
Handbook (London and Portland, OR 2002) 344. An official KGB dictionary from 
the 1970s gives the same definition. Vysshaya Krasnoznamennaya Shkola Komiteta 
Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR imeni F.E. Dzerzhinskogo, 
Kontrrazvedyvatelnyy slovar’ [Red Banner Higher School of the Committee of State 




connotations associated with the term ‘agent’ in present-day Russia.31 The 
lack of reference to the homosexuality of such a well-known Soviet agent 
like Guy Burgess has undoubtedly partly to do with the strong prejudice 
against homosexuals in today’s Russian society, which is also evident in the 
blatantly homophobic legislation that was recently adopted under President 
Vladimir Putin.32 It seems that in the case of the Essays on the History of 
Russian Foreign Intelligence there is clearly a tendency to leave out 
information which is deemed embarrassing for the present Russian service, 
even if there is no valid operational reason to do so, like protecting the 
identities of agents. It does not seem far-fetched to conclude that The 
Mitrokhin Archive, as the KGB’s ‘unofficial history’, offers a much more 
complete version of its history. 
In the 1990s the Russian government and its foreign intelligence 
service SVR took the decision to make some files available to selected 
Western authors for books intended for publication in the West. Apparently 
in the final years of the Soviet Union there was an awareness on the part of 
the KGB leadership that the image of the service needed improvement and 
that this could be done by releasing files about celebrated cases from the 
past, among them the Cambridge Five. This resulted in a number of books, 
which were in some cases co-written by a Western author and a former 
KGB officer.33  Among those books, both Deadly Illusions and The Crown 
                                                                                                                       
Security of the Council of Ministers named after F.E. Dzerzhinsky. 
Counterintelligence dictionary] (Moscow 1972) 269. To be found at 
http://www.genocid.lt/KGB/ci_dictionary.pdf, accessed 29 April 2015. 
31 The current Russian practice of labelling NGO’s ‘foreign agents’ comes to mind. 
See, for instance, Human Rights Watch ed., ‘Russia: Government against Rights 
Groups’, http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/03/13/russia-government-against-
rights-groups, accessed 20 March 2015.  
32 See, for instance, M. Gevisser, ‘Life under Russia’s “Gay Propaganda” Ban’, The 
New York Times, 27 December 2013. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/28/opinion/life-under-russias-gay-
propaganda-ban.html?_r=0, accessed 19 March 2015. 
33  For the intention of the KGB leadership to improve the image of their 
organisation and a short discussion of some of the publications that were the result 
of this, see Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive,  26-27. Among the books 
that added important new details to the story of the Cambridge Five were J. 
Costello and O. Tsarev, Deadly Illusions (London 1993) and N. West and O. Tsarev, 
The Crown Jewels: The British Secrets at the Heart of the KGB Archives (London 1998). 
Oleg Tsarev was a former KGB officer. A major work on Philby was also written 




Jewels discuss Burgess’ homosexuality and its central place in his character. It 
is only in a publication like Essays on the History of Russian Foreign 
Intelligence, aimed primarily at a Russian public, that such things apparently 
cannot be said. It seems likely that in the publications co-written by the 
former KGB officer Oleg Tsarev and Western authors information that 
reflects badly on Soviet intelligence is sometimes simply left out, since the 
selection of the material used was done by the SVR.34  
 
 
Declassification of archives 
 
Apart from commissioning the writing of official histories there is another 
way, of course, by which an intelligence or security service can show 
openness and transparency concerning its own past, namely by declassifying 
its records. Declassification will never be total, because services for one 
thing want to protect the identities of agents that have not become known 
so far. They also prefer not to be completely open about their modus 
operandi, but as a result of declassification any interested historian can work 
with at least some of the archive material. The record of intelligence and 
security services in Western countries in this respect tends to differ 
considerably, not only by country, but even services of one and the same 
country deal with this issue not always in the same way. The approaches by 
the two main British services, MI5 and MI6, for instance, stand in stark 
contrast. MI5 is a service which releases documents from its archives on a 
regular basis and does so without a legal obligation to do so. The 
declassification of MI5 records has, for instance, led to a substantial number 
of publications on the famous Double-Cross System, of World War II 
fame.35 MI6, on the other hand, has made it its explicit policy not to release 
                                                                                                                       
by a Russian journalist who had done extensive interviews with Philby in Moscow 
and received material from the KGB archive. G. Borovik, The Philby Files: The Secret 
Life of the Master Spy – KGB Archives Revealed (London 1994). 
34 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, 27. 
35 The Double-Cross System was used by British government agencies, MI5 in 
particular, to send misleading information to the German High Command through 
an elaborate system of double agents. In particular, it was used to deceive the 
Germans about the location of the Allied landings in France in June 1944. Among 
the books recently written on the Double-Cross System and its agents are B. 
Macintyre, Double Cross: The True Story of the D-Day Spies (London 2012); N. West 




material from its archives into the public domain, with the argument that its 
sources (i.e. agents) need to be protected.36 So whatever has been written in 
the West about the cases of notorious MI6 traitors like Philby and Blake, 
has been written without any access to MI6 archives at all. In the United 
States no official histories have been written on the three main services, 
CIA, FBI and NSA, but they have declassified many documents over the 
years, especially since the end of the Cold War, even though this doesn’t 
seem to be a systematic process in the way MI5 releases documents on a 
regular basis. What often happens is that a selection of documents having to 
do with a particular case or issue is declassified in bulk.37 Within the CIA, 
the Center for the Study of Intelligence has as its mission the study of 
intelligence past and present. It has many publications on its website, some 
of them written by members of the CIA history staff; declassified articles 
from the CIA in-house journal Studies in Intelligence are also made available 
there.38 The importance of this material provides ample compensation for 
                                                                                                                       
and M. Roberts, Snow: The Double Life of a World War II Spy (London 2011); R. Miller, 
Codename Tricycle: The True Story of the Second World War’s Most Extraordinary Double 
Agent (London 2005).  
36 As the British intelligence historian Nigel West put it in an email to this author 
on 30 March 2015: ‘MI5 is the exception because it voluntarily sends declassified 
files to Kew [the National Archives]. It is not required to do so as it is exempt from 
the Public Records Act. It is also exempt from the Freedom of Information Act. 
SIS [MI6] never knowingly declassifies anything voluntarily.’ In 2014, for instance, 
MI5 released 110 records to the National Archives which was the 30th time it did so. 
The total number of released records at that moment stood at 5138. See 
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/news/security-service-release-feb-2014-
introduction.htm, accessed on 30 March 2015. For MI6’s stance on not releasing 
any material to the National Archives see https://www.sis.gov.uk/our-
history/archive.html, accessed 1 April 2015.   
37  For the FBI see, for instance, 
http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2007/january/records_011007, accessed 1 April 
2015. The NSA decided in early 2015 to declassify 52.000 pages related to the 
career of William Friedman (1891-1969), the founding father of U.S. code-breaking. 
http://www.matthewaid.com/post/114495645076/nsa-begins-releasing-52-000-
pages-of-documents, accessed 1 April 2015. For the CIA, see for instance 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/, accessed 1 April 2015. 
38  https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence, accessed 13 
May 2015. For declassified articles from Studies in Intelligence see  
http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/declassified-articles-studies-intelligence-
ic%E2%80%99s-journal-intelligence-professional, accessed 1 April 2015.  




the fact that there is no CIA official history. In the Netherlands, the process 
of declassifying material from the archives of the two main services, the 
Defense Intelligence and Security Service (Militaire Inlichtingen en 
Veiligheidsdienst, MIVD) and its civilian counterpart the AIVD, is still in its 
infancy. 39  Declassification, in other words, seems at first sight in many 





The record with respect to official histories in countries where they have 
been published is uneven, to say the least. Not only does the question of 
lack of access by other historians than the selected few prove an intractable 
problem, but in some cases even in Western countries services cannot 
always be counted on to allow selected historians to discuss embarrassing 
episodes from their history as the example of MI6 and the choice of the 
years covered in its official history shows. In the case of the Russian official 
history series it would seem that it is also less than forthcoming about 
disclosing information which is for some reason considered embarrassing to 
the SVR and its predecessors. Nevertheless, it is to be hoped that more 
official histories will be published, especially in Western countries where 
this has not happened so far. Slowly and gradually, especially since the 
1990s, there seems to be a growing awareness at least in the West, that the 
history of an intelligence and security service is not to be regarded as the 
eternal property of one particular government organisation, but should be 
shared, to the extent possible, with a wider public, historians and non-
historians alike. 
                                                     
39 http://www.nationaalarchief.nl/waardering-selectie/selectielijsten-ter-inzage,  
accessed 1 April 2015. There is a website in the Netherlands which has many 
documents that were released from the AIVD archives on the basis of the Dutch 
version of the Freedom of Information Act.  
See http://www.stichtingargus.nl/bvd/index.htm, accessed 1 April 2015. The 
release of these documents does not take place on the basis of a regular 
declassification process and for the applicant who seeks their release it is a very 
time-consuming and cumbersome process.  
